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Abstract 
The paper explores the relationship between airport economic regulation and capital investment incentives 
with specific reference to the United Kingdom experience.  It is shown that little evidence can be found of 
under-investment at those airports subject to price-cap regulation. Indeed, several examples were found 
which shows that there may have been a tendency to over-investment at various price-capped airports.  UK 
competition authorities believe that there has been reluctance on the part of BAA to expand capacity and 
appear to be pressing for competition between London airports to alleviate the problem.  The paper argues 
that expanded capacity is more likely if BAA retains its control of the three main London airports.  Also, 
given that the process of economic regulation has become more complicated and costly, it is recommended 
that price-cap regulation is replaced by a more light-handed approach (prices surveillance or reserve power 
regulation).    
 
Introduction 
 
In 2003, the UK Government published a white paper on the future development of airports 1.  
This document presented options for each region on the scale and location of airport investment 
needed to meet future air passenger demand.  One important recommendation was that 
additional runway capacity was needed in the London area.  The Government recommended that 
two new runways should be built; one at Heathrow and one at Stansted.  
 
Twenty years ago, the government started the process of privatising UK airports.  The 1986 
Airports Act transferred the British Airports Authority from state to private ownership and 
required most local authority-owned airports to be managed by commercially-orientated limited 
companies 2. The Act effectively initiated the transfer of airport investment decision-making from 
the public to private sector.   The Act also subjected four airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted 
and Manchester) to price cap regulation of their aeronautical charges.  The use of price-cap 
regulation was intended to protect the interests of airlines against potential abuse of market 
power by the airport companies and to encourage greater efficiency in their operations and 
investment.   Since 1987, the UK regulator, which is the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), has had to 
strike a balance between a requirement to protect airline interests on the one hand with, on the 
other hand, the need allow airports to earn sustainable rate of return which provides a sufficient 
incentive for timely investment in additional capacity.   The aim of this paper is to investigate what 
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etc). Manchester Airport is the only airport of significant size in the UK to be still fully owned by a local authority.  
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effects economic regulation has had on airport capital investment in the UK and to identify some 
implications from this experience for future regulatory policy. 
 
Prior to privatisation in 1987, the government needed to decide whether to sell the BAA as a 
group or as individual airports.  BAA directors had managed to persuade the government not to 
break-up the company arguing that the scope for competition between airports was limited and 
that separate ownership would have complicated the application of traffic distribution rules which 
regulated the type of air services that could be accommodated by each London airport (Starkie, 
2001).  Because of the decision to sell BAA as a single entity, the government needed to establish a 
system of economic regulation to prevent the company from potentially abusing its dominance of 
the London airport market 3. Examples of monopolistic abuse include setting excessively high user 
charges, reducing the quality of services to airlines and passengers, engaging in exaggerated 
investment programmes and passing on the costs to airlines, or withholding investment in order 
to secure higher rates of return.   
 
The method of economic regulation that was adopted had been previously tested on privatised 
public utility companies operating in the electricity, telecommunications and water industries.  
Under this system of incentive–based price-cap regulation, BAA and Manchester airports were 
permitted to adjust their aeronautical charges so that in each year the projected increase in 
average aeronautical revenue per passenger did not exceed the forecast inflation rate (RPI) minus 
a factor X.   The scope of the price-cap was limited to aeronautical charges because it is in the 
supply and pricing of aeronautical services where the airport is deemed to have the potential to 
exert market power.  Only the three BAA London airports were subject to price cap regulation - 
Aberdeen Edinburgh and Glasgow were excluded.  Nonetheless BAA decided to apply a voluntary 
RPI-3 to aeronautical revenue generated at its Scottish airports following privatisation.   The RPI-X 
formula, which was to be reviewed every five years (one control period), incentivises the airport 
operator to become more efficient while at the same time ensuring that it is able to generate a 
reasonable rate of return.   In fixing the value of X for the forthcoming control period, the 
regulator takes into account efficiency gains that the airport would be expected to achieve, 
anticipated revenue from non-aeronautical activities (e.g. retail), the allowed rate of return, 
planned capital investment and forecast traffic and operating costs.   According to Starkie (2005), 
this approach is regarded as providing strong incentives for improved efficiency since the airport 
operator is able to generate higher than expected profits from cost savings not anticipated when 
setting X.   The opportunity to outperform the price cap assessment over the control period 
provides the incentive to minimise costs.   A high positive X (i.e. RPI-X leading to lower real 
charges) might indicate that the regulated airport revealed substantial cost savings in the previous 
control period or it may indicate that the regulator expects there to be considerable scope for 
further efficiency improvements in the following control period.  A high negative X (i.e. RPI+X, 
allowing a real charge increase) is an indication that the regulator might be placing more emphasis 
on the regulated airport’s planned investment programme (Hendriks and Andrew, 2004).    
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Another important feature of the system of airport economic regulation in the UK was the 
requirement on BAA to maintain the single-till system as the basis for setting aeronautical charges.  
Under the single-till, aeronautical charges are set to recover the airport’s net operating and capital 
costs after deducting revenues from non-aeronautical activities (i.e. retail, car parks).  In other 
words, revenues from retail operations are used to cross-subsidise low aeronautical charges.  Not 
surprisingly the single-till system has strong support in the airline industry.  The dual-till, in 
contrast, is where aeronautical charges are set to recover aeronautical operating and capital costs. 
Given that aeronautical operating and capital costs can account for in excess of 50% of an airport’s 
total costs, user charges would be expected to be much higher than under a single-till system. It is 
because of this that airlines have been opposed to the adoption of dual-till pricing.  
 
Economic regulation and investment incentives 
 
At some stage in an airport’s long-term development, large scale capital investment projects 
designed to expand capacity will need to be undertaken, for example, the construction of a new 
runway or passenger terminal.    Assuming that airport directors are rational and driven by profit 
maximising goals only, the decision on whether to proceed with such large scale developments 
would be based primarily on commercial judgement.  Commercial judgement is critical in that 
large projects can represent significant sunk and irreversible financial commitments.   For 
example, should traffic forecasts used to justify a second runway fail to materialise, there will be 
few alternative uses for this sunk investment and the airport operator will be left with a costly and 
under-utilised asset.   How is investment treated under different models of ownership? 
 
Helm and Thompson (1991) cite the problem of infrastructure over-investment under public 
ownership.  For example, if an airport is publically owned it is possible that the managers (agents) 
and the shareholder (principal) could hold very divergent views on an airport’s capital investment 
requirements.  Take the example of a publically-owned airport considering whether to extend its 
main runway.  Their ambitions are driven by the prospect of enabling the airport to accommodate 
long-haul aircraft operations thereby improving connectivity to important overseas destinations.   
The managers’ investment appraisal may conclude that a runway extension is not commercially 
viable because the estimated marginal capital and operating costs would exceed the benefits in 
terms of the incremental revenues generated from new long-haul services.   On the other hand, 
the public shareholder could take a different view and instruct the managers to proceed with the 
investment on the basis that there are significant wider social and economic benefits to extending 
the runway as this has the potential to improve the region’s accessibility to world markets. 
 
In contrast, a privately–owned airport, subject to economic regulation, may operate differently. 
Helm and Thompson (1991) identify what is commonly referred to as a “hold-up” problem in an 
environment where the regulated entity is subject to RPI-X price cap regulation.  For example, the 
airport may invest during the control period at levels below that planned at the regulatory review.  
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This would have had the effect of increasing the rate of return to the regulated airport over the 
control period.  The “hold-up” problem is particularly relevant in the case of long-term 
investments that are both sunk and irreversible in nature where there are is a considerable 
divergence between the life of the asset (e.g. 30 years for a terminal) and the typical length of  a 
regulatory control period (5 years).   Furthermore, there may be a temptation on the part of the 
airport to engage in acts of strategic manipulation or gaming.  This is achieved through lowering 
investment below planned levels in the hope that there is a relaxation in the price-cap to be 
applied for the forthcoming control period.  However, as pointed out by Starkie (2004), the 
regulator may react to strategic manipulation by adjusting the value of X against the commercial 
interests of the regulated airport at the forthcoming review.  This is because the regulator, as well 
as projecting forward into the next control period, may decide that an excessive rate of return 
achieved through under-investment was secured by the airport during the previous control period.  
However, having said all of this, there may appear to be stronger arguments in favour of the view 
that an airport may exaggerate its planned investment during the regulatory review.   This is likely 
to occur where the regulator is committing a disproportionate level of attention on the regulatory 
asset base and the rate of return in the determination of X.   If this is the case, the airport would 
be incentivised at the review to confidently expand its asset base with a high probability that X will 
be set to ensure that it receives an adequate rate of return over the control period.  The result is 
higher charges and inflated profits.  The application of RPI-X regulation could therefore lead to the 
same dysfunctional effects as rate of return regulation (Averch-Johnston effects 4).  The problem is 
compounded by the presence of information asymmetries between the regulator and regulated 
entity.  Regulators in most cases will not possess sufficient knowledge of the airport’s cost 
function to validate or challenge proposed capital investment plans.  But why would an airport 
engage in exaggerating the expansion of its asset base in the first place?  Starkie (2006) offers two 
explanations.  Firstly, he believes that while under-investment may increase the rate of return, it is 
also a strategy associated with many risks.  Under-investment could lead to increased queuing and 
congestion which would have adverse implications for the quality of service in airports 
experienced by both passengers and airlines.  Such an outcome would damage the reputation of 
the airport probably leading to conflict with airlines and the risk of more intrusive regulation in the 
future.  Airport managers may prefer the comforts of over-investment to the future risks, 
uncertainties and dangers associated with under-investment.   Secondly, Starkie refers to what 
appears to be a culture of expansionism amongst airport directors where their ambitions to 
manage larger organisations would lead them to over-expand assets.   There may be some truth to 
this assertion although there is very little supporting evidence in the literature.   At best, one 
would need to refer to anecdotal evidence such as the numerous airport websites and annual 
reports that boast of ambitious projects frequently citing the amounts of spending involved.   
“Gold-plating”, in the airport context has been recognised as a fairly significant problem, 
particularly amongst airlines.  This is where newly constructed assets have either been excessively 
decorated or have been designed to deliver a level of service and functionality in excess of that 
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demanded by users.  Barrett (2004) argues that gold-plating has been a particularly common 
charge levelled by low cost airlines against airports.  IATA (2005) also highlights the problem of 
airports “gold-plating their assets” where Toronto Pearson Airport in Canada is cited as one 
specific example.  “Gold-plating” can occur at different phases of the development process.   At 
the design phase of a project, airport architects, incentivised by the prospects of gaining 
prestigious awards, are granted the creative latitude by airport directors to design ostentatious 
terminal facilities with very little reference to cost efficiency or commercial imperatives.  Payment 
mechanisms linked to the value of the project, known to exit in some quarters of the industry will 
excacerbate this problem.  In these circumstances, airport directors may be driven by a desire to 
create and showcase decorated airport facilities that a generate a poor financial return and can 
only be remunerated through passing on excess costs as higher charges to airlines.  Because of 
information asymmetries it can be difficult for regulators to detect gold-plating without more 
intrusive surveillance of the airport’s activities.     
 
The confused signals emanating from price-capped charges that are economically inefficient can 
also potentially lead to over-investment in airport facilities.  It is for this reason that long-run 
marginal cost pricing has long been advocated for capital intensive industries (Doganis, 1992).  If 
charges paid by existing airlines are based on the costs of providing extra capacity in the long-
term, airport managers will be able to determine how much true demand there is for using the 
additional capacity and whether the new investment can be financially remunerated.  In this 
context there is a role for peak-period pricing since new capacity is always driven by peak-period 
users.  For example, consider the case of an airport seeking to build a second runway.  Airlines 
operating during peak periods would be charged fees based on long-run marginal cost of building 
the second runway.  Those airlines who did not value access to the peak period as highly as the 
long-run marginal costs of producing the additional capacity would switch to operating at an off-
peak time as the charge would be substantially lower, probably based on the short-run marginal 
costs of operating during the off-peak period.  However, those airlines who value operating during 
the peak period at least as highly as the long-run marginal costs of building a second runway 
would continue to operate during the peak.  This would provide the necessary signals for whether 
to proceed with the new investment or not.     
 
The role of pricing in improving investment incentives can also be considered in the context of the 
relative efficiencies of both single and dual-till charging systems.   The Dual-till approach is known 
to have superior incentive properties to the single-till. Oum et al (2004), for example, provides 
evidence that under a price-capped environment, the scale of under-investment is much less 
where charges are based on the dual as opposed to single-till principle.  Investment incentives are 
more effective if the airport is allowed to earn a rate of return on its aeronautical assets without 
any reference to non-aeronautical revenues.  Starkie (2001) argues that there is much to be gained 
from removing the single-till approach and replacing it with a dual-till framework. 
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The UK experience 
 
RPI-X 
 
Since 1987, BAA and Manchester Airport have been subjected to 4 price control periods.  In 2008, 
the CAA set a series of price controls for the fifth period (2008-13) and at the same time decided 
to de-designate Manchester airport from price-cap regulation altogether.  In the first control 
period between 1987 and 1992 the three BAA London airports were subject to the same RPI-1 
price cap for each year within the control period.  In the second control period (1992-1997), the 
CAA limited the increase in aeronautical revenue to RPI-8 in the first two years, RPI-4 in year 3 and 
RPI-3 in the last two years.  In the 1998-2003 period, there was a separation in the price caps 
applied to Stansted.  Stansted’s cap was set at RPI+1 while the CAA subjected both Heathrow and 
Gatwick to RPI-3 for the entire period.   There was a significant shift in emphasis for the fourth 
review period (2003-2008) where, because of the scale of investment proposed by BAA (Terminal 
5), the price-cap was set at RPI+6.5 for Heathrow and RPI-0 for both Gatwick and Stansted for the 
entire period.  In the early period shortly after privatisation, investment requirements were 
comparatively low, BAA had completed new terminals for both Gatwick (North Terminal) and 
Heathrow (Terminal 4) just prior to privatisation.  Although both airports appeared to be operating 
close to full capacity at that time in terms of runway utilisation, Stansted was handling traffic 
significantly below its planned capacity so the urgency for additional runway capacity in the South 
East at that time appeared much less pressing than in 2008.  Indeed, while the price-cap for 
Stansted appeared to be more relaxed than at the other airports post-1998, competition from 
Luton Airport ensured that aeronautical charges at Stansted were set to generate revenue at a 
level below the RPI+1 limit.   
 
Capital Expenditure 
 
In the second control period 1998-2003, there was an expectation that BAA would begin 
construction of Terminal 5 hence there was a relaxation of the price cap which was followed by 
further relaxation in the third and fourth control periods.  However, there were significant delays 
in the construction of Terminal 5 due to the protracted planning process. According to Figure 1 
below, actual delivered capital investment was below that planned for the second control period.   
If one compares BAA’s past performance, for each of the last three control periods, actual 
investment has exceeded planned investment.  
 
The divergence between planned and actual investment can be explained by the effects of 
unexpected market developments on air traffic volumes that materialised during control periods.  
For example, in the period 1992-1997, the removal of traffic distribution rules at Heathrow meant 
that traffic was greater than that forecast and BAA was required to spend additional investment 
on its facilities.  Similarly, in the 2003-2008 period, BAA under-spent at Gatwick because of lower 
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than forecast traffic and an unanticipated decline in long-haul aircraft operations.  Stansted 
invested, in the 1998-2003 period, substantially more than planned receiving a capital expenditure 
allocation originally earmarked for Terminal 5 at Heathrow which was subject to lengthy delay.  
Rather than a withholding problem, there could even be evidence of in this particular example of 
over- investment. 
 
Figure 1: BAA actual investment as a % of planned investment last three price-cap control 
periods 
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Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission & Competition Commission 
 
Figure 2 contrasts capital investment trends over the 1988/89 to 2005/06 period for UK airports.  
Total UK airport capital investment does show a marked increase post 2003/03.  This is largely 
attributed to BAA spending on Terminal 5.  Overall the average annual percentage change in UK 
airport capital expenditure over the period 1988/89 to 2005/06 was 17% in contrast to an annual 
passenger growth rate of 8.1%.  For the BAA regulated airports the contrast is even more 
significant – 23% annual investment growth as opposed to 6% annual traffic growth.  For both 
Manchester and the non-regulated airports, average annual passenger growth out performs the 
annual growth in capital investment.  From these trends it is difficult to defend the argument that 
there has been an airport investment withholding problem in the UK.   
 
Starkie (2006) argues that exactly the opposite may have happened. Two examples are cited; 
Stansted and Manchester.  In the case of Manchester, the airport operator was criticised for failing 
to test the application of long-run marginal cost pricing when evaluating the second runway even 
when it was encouraged to do so at its first regulatory review in 1991.  Starkie further speculates 
that the second runway may have been aimed at pre-empting competitive developments at 
Liverpool and even suggests that pre-emption was behind Stansted’s expansion in the 1990s.   In 
the case of Stansted, he argues that the airport developed too rapidly in the late 1990s leading to 
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excess capacity.  This was mainly due to a strategy adopted by BAA directors to grow the company 
given the presence of planning restrictions at both Heathrow and Gatwick.   Because of delays in 
the planning process, funds committed for Terminal 5 were used to expand Stansted.    BAA was 
allowed to leverage its financial muscle at Heathrow to expand Stansted because at that time the 
price-cap was set on the BAA London airports as an integrated-whole.   
 
 
The argument of over-expansion appears to be supported by Francis and Humphreys (2001) who 
claim that airport economic regulation has resulted in a variety of unforeseen dysfunctional 
effects. They argue that price-cap regulation has kept charges low at Heathrow and Gatwick which 
has artificially stimulated demand leading to pressure to expand capacity.  This has contributed to 
an expansionist planning mentality that has encouraged the development of large-scale projects 
such as Terminal 5.  The failure to apply the principle of long-run marginal cost pricing (LRMCP) is a 
key issue in this regard though this was not through want of trying.  In the early 1980s BAA 
evaluated the application of LRMCP in advance of the construction of Terminal 4.  Fearing higher 
costs, these proposals were rejected by the airline industry. 
 
Figure 1: UK airport capital investment 1988-89 to 2005-06 in £000 (in real terms)  
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Source: Centre for Regulated Industries 
 
Francis and Humphreys also claim that economic regulation has had the effect of orientating the 
attention of BAA towards non-regulated activities such as retail at the expense of passenger 
service.  Expansion in the volume of retail space at Heathrow at the expense of improving 
passenger processing efficiency is cited as an example.  They argue that more space for core 
aeronautical service delivery usage would reduce the requirement to build additional terminal 
capacity.  This raises the question of whether there is an inherent trade-off between developing 
airport retail and maintaining acceptable levels of passenger comfort and processing efficiency.   
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Price regulation of aeronautical charges reduces the rate of return that can be earned on 
investment in aeronautical facilities and infrastructure.  The airport’s rate of return, therefore, has 
to be earned on non-aeronautical facilities such as retail and car parks.  As a consequence there is 
an incentive under a price-capped regime to increase terminal space allocated to non-aeronautical 
activities and to focus management efforts into expanding and developing retail.  Differences in 
the typical rates of return that could be earned from aeronautical and retail activities can be quite 
substantial.  For example, Manchester Airport, which was price-capped until very recently, 
incurred an operating loss of £6.7 million in 2005/06 on its aeronautical activities.  In contrast, 
£78.5 million in operating profit was earned from its non-aeronautical / commercial activities.  The 
authors, in their criticism of the priorities of BAA, imply that there is too much retail space at BAA 
airports, particularly Heathrow.  On the other hand it could be argued that BAA is simply 
responding to firstly, price-cap regulation and secondly, customer demand.  Research work 
undertaken by Entwistle (2007) based on a survey of airport passengers reveals that nearly all 
respondents preferred the availability of shops in an airport with around 95% agreeing that shops 
add colour and atmosphere to an airport terminal. The research also showed that around 60% of 
passengers planned to make a retail purchase prior to their arrival at the airport.   How much 
value they place on retail vis a vis processing efficiency, comfort and level of service is an 
interesting question that has yet to be researched.  However, what is important is the 
complimentary relationship between processing efficiency and spend in the retail areas.  As 
outlined by Gray (2005), there is a very clear correlation between dwell time (time available to 
spend in the airside retail zone) and the level of spend by passengers in those retail outlets.  
Therefore, it is in the commercial interests of the airport operator to ensure that processes (check-
in, passenger security screening) are streamlined to enable passengers to have sufficient dwell 
time before their flight departs.   This means there needs to be investment on the part of the 
airport operator for sufficient security resources in order to minimise queuing time.   Recent 
changes in security requirements at European airports, for example, have had a marked effect on 
passenger processing efficiency. In many airports, confusion and security resources struggling to 
cope with queuing has brought the retail versus processing efficiency / passenger comfort debate 
into much sharper focus.  
 
Given that economic regulation appears to have had some unintended consequences, what are 
the prospects for reform in the UK?   
 
Airport deregulation / liberalisation: the implications for capital investment  
 
Following pressure from some UK carriers, in 2006, national competition authorities (Office of fair 
Trading and Competition Commission) launched an investigation into the market structure of the 
UK airport industry.  The focus of their enquiry, which is expected to be completed in 2009, was on 
whether BAA’s dominance of the airport markets in London and Central Scotland was working in 
the best interests of passengers.  Preliminary findings released in April 2008 show that the 
Competition Commission supports the view that BAA’s common ownership of airports may not be 
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serving the best interests of airlines or passengers (Competition Commission, 2008).  Assuming 
that there is a recommendation requiring BAA to dispose of a number of its airports, what would 
the expected implications be for both economic regulation and capital investment?      
 
Price cap regulation is, in effect, a substitute for airport competition.  Where there is airport 
competition – the rationale for maintaining price caps disappears as independently operated 
airports have incentives to compete for new airline services in terms of price and quality of 
service.  The Competition Commission’s report recognises the existence of a significant degree of 
competition between airports in other regions of the UK (e.g. West Midlands, South West and 
Wales. North West).  Furthermore the report cited examples of airlines using their bargaining 
leverage between airports to secure commercially advantageous terms and conditions.   One 
common feature of these examples of airport competition is that they exist in regions that have no 
urgent or pressing need for new runway capacity.   The 2003 white paper recommended that 
there should be two new runways built outside of London; one in Birmingham and the other at 
Edinburgh.   Whilst Birmingham initially developed a proposal for a second runway in a draft 
master plan, this has since been withdrawn due to substantial revisions to traffic forecasts in light 
of changes in its business environment not anticipated at the time of publication of the White 
Paper.  Where spare capacity exists, regional airports will continue to compete on price and 
quality of service in order to expand passenger and aircraft throughput. 
 
In contrast, the situation facing the London airport market is very different.  According to 
Eddington (2006), 40% of delays at Heathrow and Gatwick airports are caused by late arriving 
flights due to a shortage of runway capacity.  Now assuming that the three airports are managed 
by separate operators and price-cap competition is lifted, it is unlikely there will be a downward 
movement in charges.   Stansted, because of the greater availability of spare capacity may engage 
in price competition but this is unlikely to lead to substantial increased demand.   The reason is 
that airlines consider factors in addition to airport charges when deciding on which airport to 
operate services from.  For example, variables such as yield, accessibility to target catchment area 
and value of the airport to passengers may be more important.  This is particularly applicable to 
long-haul airlines where less than 10% of their direct operating costs are accounted for by airport 
charges.   Indeed, historically airport charges have been much lower at Stansted compared to 
Heathrow and Gatwick, primarily because of competition from Luton.   Low charges at Stansted 
did not lead to significant switching of airline routes from Heathrow.  Indeed, removing the price-
cap would probably lead to higher charges, particularly at Heathrow.  This is why airlines in the UK, 
such as British Airways are in favour of maintaining price-cap regulation even in the event of 
airport ownership liberalisation in the London area.   They point to the risks that would face large 
fixed base carriers such as British Airways who operate their entire network from Heathrow and 
have a number of substantial sunk investments at the airport.  The switching costs associated with 
transferring to another airport in the London area would be far too high and indeed would be 
impossible to achieve as there are no alternative airports in the London area that could 
accommodate the scale of British Airways’ network of services at Heathrow.   The likely benefits of 
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competition may in fact be in quality of service where the presence of different operators in the 
London airports would create diversity and vitality that presently appears absent.   How could 
these very real concerns relating to airport market power even in an environment of competition 
be addressed through another form of regulation?   
 
One possible solution is to adopt a “light handed” approach to regulation.  There are two 
approaches that have already been tested, prices surveillance as has been applied to airports in 
Australia and reserve power regulation as adopted in Copenhagen.   In both cases the regulator 
accepts their own limitations with regard to determining appropriate levels of charges, quality of 
service and capital investment and transfers this responsibility to the airport and the airlines. The 
adoption of “light-handed regulation” also potentially reduces high transaction costs associated 
with heavy-handed regulation. Toms (2004), for example, cites the increasing amount of time 
taken to complete successive regulatory reviews in the UK. 
 
Airports are left to negotiate with airlines on charges and capital investment with the regulator 
holding reserve powers.  Here there are strong incentives on the airlines and the airport to reach 
an agreement since there is a risk that in the event of a breakdown in the relationship the 
regulator may intervene with a settlement that may have adverse consequences for either one of 
the parties.  Given the rather fractious nature of airport-airline relations generally, how easy 
would it be for them to reach agreement?  Klenk (2004) provides an example from Frankfurt 
where, from 2002, a reasonably successful five-year risk sharing airport charges agreement has 
been in place between the airport operator and its airline customers.  However, in situations 
where there are significant differences between airlines, to what extent is it possible to reach a 
common understanding with the airport?  As far as capital investment is concerned, would existing 
incumbent airlines, especially low cost carriers, support the expansion of capacity with possible 
repercussions on the level of charges?  Would incumbent airlines block attempts to expand 
capacity in the interests of reducing the risk of competition from new entrants? 
 
The Competition Commission Report suggests that BAA’s common ownership was originally 
intended to facilitate capacity expansion. They argue that this has not happened and that BAA has 
over the years taken a modest view on capacity expansion in the London area.   It argues that 
BAA’s development has been too late to meet demand.  Common ownership, according to the 
report, had led to a sequential approach to capacity expansion.  What is likely to be the view on 
capacity expansion under conditions where all three airports are owned and operated by separate 
entities?   
 
Given forecasts for substantial growth in air travel demand from and to the London area, the three 
airports may take a very optimistic view on future business prospects.   If one assumes for the 
moment that there are no planning approval requirements, it is possible that the operators of 
Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted could seek to gain first mover advantage by proceeding with 
development plans for a second runway each.  This would, in effect, substantially alleviate 
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congestion problems in the London airport system.  However, there may be factors which would 
act as a disincentive to expand capacity.  First, new owners would have to initially finance the cost 
of purchasing the airport followed by securing funding to build the new runway.  Assume that BAA 
/ Ferrovial sold Stansted to an independent operator.  This operator could possibly have to pay 
around £700 million to £1 billion for the airport if one adopts a conservative assumed Enterprise 
Value / EBITDA multiple of 10 5.  Assume that the operator accepts BAA’s estimate of the cost of 
building a second runway to be £1.5 billion, its total financial commitment in relation to Stansted 
could amount to £2.5 billion.   Under these circumstances it is unlikely, even in a scenario of a 
liberalised planning regime, that the operator would commit to a second runway.   Now, assuming 
that the existing planning approvals process is in place, a new owner of Stansted would face the 
added complication of navigating itself through a very lengthy and costly planning approvals 
process in addition to facing the prospects of intense and well organised opposition from 
environmentalists and local pressure groups.  Experience from recent major UK investment 
projects such as Manchester’s second runway and Heathrow’s Terminal 5, shows that airport 
planning processes can take up to 10 years.  With considerable environmental and local opposition 
to runway expansion and reluctance on the part of the airlines to accept higher charges that 
would be needed to finance the second runway, a new owner of Stansted airport may in fact be 
very reluctant to expand capacity.  The incentive to expand capacity may in fact be offset by 
expectations of having to subject itself to an onerous and costly planning process should a decision 
be taken to expand capacity. 
 
BAA has already submitted a planning application to build a second runway at Stansted, scheduled 
to open in 2015 while it has also outlined its intention to build a third runway and sixth terminal at 
Heathrow by 2019.   The case for airport liberalisation, if the primary policy objective is to expand 
capacity, may not, in light of these issues, be particularly persuasive.   In fact the existing BAA 
expansion plans, delivered by one integrated company on the strength of a balance sheet that is 
supported by the assets of all the airports, provided they are approved by the relevant local and 
national authorities, represent the best prospects for capacity expansion in the London area.   
 
Concluding comments 
 
This paper has shown that it is difficult to find a strong case in favour of the argument that price 
cap regulation led to under-investment in airport capacity.  In contrast, there may even be an 
argument to support the view that there was excess investment.   Examples cited include 
Manchester Airport’s second runway, Stansted Airport’s expansion in the 1990s and the 
development of Heathrow’s Terminal 5.   Price-cap regulation, in particular  reliance on the single-
till mechanism, has had the effect of obscuring the signals for investment that would have been 
present had charges been set on the basis of economic efficiency (i.e. long-run marginal cost or 
market clearing).   Instead the persistence of comparatively low charges levied by BAA London 
                                                 
5
 According to Graham (2003),  Enterprise Value / EBITDA multiples of around 15 were achieved on some 
privatisation transactions in the late 1990s  
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airports appears to have artificially stimulated demand fuelling the rationale for capacity 
expansion.  A well organised and vocal airline industry lobby ensured, in the first place, that RPI-X 
was the preferred model of economic regulation. This has provided them with the opportunity to 
extract considerable economic scarcity rent from their Heathrow route networks for at least 
twenty years.  Their very persuasive hold on the direction of UK government policy towards air 
transport means that proposals to reform economic regulation in the UK are invariably shelved.   
Their considerable influence prompted the competition authority investigations into BAA’s alleged 
dominance of the airport market with the aim being to liberalise ownership of London’s principal 
airports.  It is unlikely that a liberalised London airport market will be able to deliver capacity 
expansion.   Highly leveraged independent operators will be constrained by a complex, lengthy 
and onerous planning system and resistance from highly organised, well connected and vocal 
pressure groups.  BAA’s ownership of the three London airports should be maintained as this 
represents the only credible option of delivering additional capacity.  The UK could also benefit 
from light handed economic regulation with BAA and its airline customers encouraged to reach an 
agreement on what level of capacity is needed for the future and how this should be 
remunerated. 
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